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on the basis of the sub-contract entitled to the benefits provided
by the prime contract as well as bound by its provisions otherwise. The court's disposition of the case accorded with the agreement between the parties and also satisfied the ends of justice.
Both plaintiff and defendant seem to have profited by the generosity of the Corps of Engineers in making an adjustment because of a called work suspension.
In Pechon v. National CorporationService, Inc.,18 an employment contract was found to be for an indefinite time and therefore terminable at will.
PARTICULAR CONTRACTS
SALE
J. Denson Smith*
The case of Wells v. Joseph' raises a serious question affecting the public records doctrine. The decision held that an unrecorded tax redemption was effective against a purchaser from
the heirs of the tax adjudicatee in his suit to quiet title. Although the redemption had not been recorded, there were of record a judgment sending the heir of the tax debtor into possession
of the property and other subsequently recorded instruments.
From this the court reasoned that having been put on inquiry as
to the title since the public records revealed that there were other
claimants to the property, and that a lawsuit to establish ownership would be necessary, the purchaser must be considered as
having bought at his peril and risk. In view of the fact that the
case is being noted elsewhere in this issue, no extensive comment
will be here made. Granting that the instruments of record may
have put the plaintiff on inquiry, an investigation of the title
could have led at most to the discovery of the unrecorded redemption. But this leaves unanswered the question of whether the unrecorded redemption could be held effective against the plaintiff
without doing violence to established principles of registry. The
public records doctrine holds that all unrecorded sales, contracts,
and judgments affecting immovable property are utterly null
and void as to third parties even when they know of their ex18. 234 La. 397, 100 So.2d 213 (1958).
*Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. 234 La. 780, 101 So.2d 667 (1958).

320

LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. XIX

istence. Is knowledge now to take the place of registry as long
as the records suggest the possible existence of an unrecorded
act? Or is the ruling to be restricted to the proposition that a
purchaser from a tax adjudicatee does not acquire title to the
property if there has been a redemption and if there is of record
discoverable evidence suggesting the possibility?
Another significant case decided during the last term was
Miller v. Miller.2 Its holding, over the dissent of Justice Simon,
that if a husband in making a dation en paiement to his wife to
replace her separate funds used by him, reserves a power of redemption, the transaction is a nullity, is an addition to the jurisprudence. The court, reversing on rehearing its original opinion,
reasoned that, since the husband has only limited powers of contract with his wife, they must be strictly construed; consequently, in view of the fact that the Code does not specifically authorize the reservation of a power of redemption in a dation en paiement by husband to wife, he has no such power. Considering the
settled policy favoring the replacing by the husband of his wife's
separate property, crystallized by the Code itself in the provision
recognizing that the husband may prefer the wife over his other
creditors, the writer does not find this reason appealing. The
fact that the husband cannot reserve a power of redemption will
have the necessary effect of discouraging the replacing by him
of his wife's separate property through the transfer to her of
his own, which goes counter to the established policy of the law.
It has long been established that where the vendor in a sale
with the right of redemption remains in possession of the property, the transaction will be considered as between the parties,
in the absence of evidence to the contrary, as a pignorative contract instead of a sale. In the case of Coddou v. Gros3 the court
found sufficient evidence to the contrary in the close family relationship between the parties and the fact that the sale in question was actually a dation en paiement to discharge an indebtedness already secured by a special mortgage on the property. The
court's observation that the continued physical possession of the
vendor affected in no way the rights of the parties because in a
sale and a dation en paiement as well, delivery accompanies the
public act transferring the property, is open to serious question.
Under the rule of Marbury v. Colber the continued possession
2. 234 La. 883, 102 So.2d 52 (1958).
3. 235 La. 25, 102 So.2d 480 (1958).
4. 105 La. 467, 29 So. 871 (1901).
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of the vendor is the controlling factor because it tends to negate
the existence of an intention to divest the vendor of ownership.
It is true that delivery of an immovable always accompanies the
public act by which the property is transferred and that this
rule is applicable to a dation en paiement. But this is a constructive delivery only which will take place although actual possession may not be surrendered. When the Code provides that delivery is essential to the perfection of a dation en paiement the
reference seems clearly to be to the delivery to be effected by the
act of transfer and not to the surrender of possession. It is then
that the "payment" is completed and there is then left no suit
to enforce the seller's obligation to deliver. This same theory
finds expression in the rules relating to the accord and satisfaction of the common law. The accord, or contract itself, does not
operate to discharge the existing indebtedness. To have this effect it must be performed, i.e., the thing to be given in satisfaction must be delivered. Otherwise, the creditor would not be any
better off. Instead of having an action on the indebtedness he
would have an action on the contract of accord; he would be giving up one cause of action for another, and such an intention is
not to be presumed. For this reason the old claim is not discharged until the accord is satisfied by performance; there must
be an accord and satisfaction. For the same reason, our Code
provides that the giving in payment is completed only by the
delivery. In the case of an immovable this delivery takes place
with the delivery of the public act. Consequently, when this is
done the transaction is complete, the agreed performance has
been rendered, and the old debt is then discharged by the giving
in payment. The dation en paiement differs from the ordinary
contract of sale in that, to follow the original theory of the Code,
in the latter case the sale is considered to be perfect and the
property is acquired of right by the purchaser as soon as there
exists a concurrence of thing, price, and consent, although the
thing has not yet been delivered nor the price paid. If the seller
fails to deliver, the buyer may sue to recover the thing on the
basis of his ownership. But a payment involves delivery, hence
the requirement that the dation en paiement is completed only by
delivery of the thing given in payment.
Of course, our jurisprudence has departed from the original
theory of the Code in sales of immovables; concurrence of thing,
price, and consent is not now enough. A written contract for the
sale and purchase of an immovable will not occasion a transfer
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of ownership between the parties. There must be an act translative of ownership, so that now when this act is delivered the sale
is perfected and ownership passes. Delivery is now required,
therefore, in order to perfect the ordinary sale of an immovable.
Consequently it no longer differs from the dation en paiement in
this respect. The distinction still holds, however, with respect
to movables. An ordinary sale of a movable will be perfected by
concurrence of thing, price, and consent, but a dation en paiement will not. This is because delivery of a movable is effected
by a physical surrender of possession, not delivery of an act. In
consequence, whereas perfection of the sale and delivery take
place at the same time in the case of an immovable, they are
separate and distinct in the case of a movable. Delivery of a
movable denotes, therefore, surrender of possession, but in the
case of an immovable it means merely the handing over of an act
translative of the property. Hence it is that delivery may be
made of an immovable without a surrender of possession of the
property. But since a retention of possession of an immovable
tends to contradict the delivery of an act of sale thereof, the
rule is that if the vendor in a sale with right of redemption continues in actual possession of the property the transaction will
be considered in the absence of evidence to the contrary as merely a security contract. This rule might well be applied, therefore,
in a dation en paiement with a right of redemption. The fact
that delivery of the act will perfect the payment should not detract from the effect to be given to the vendor's remaining in
actual possession of the thing given.
In Moore v. Sucher 5 the court made what appears to be a
questionable application of Article 1526 of the Civil Code. The
case involved a donation of property worth $14,750.00 subject
to a charge amounting to $7,584.19. The court found that the
transfer constituted an onerous donation but held that, since the
charge imposed exceeded one-half the value of the object, the
rules peculiar to donations were not applicable. Article 1526 provides, however, that the rules peculiar to donations do not apply
except when the value of the object given exceeds by one-half
that of the charges imposed. That is, the value of the object
given must exceed by one-half the value of the charges. Since
the value of the object given was $14,750.00 and the value of the
charges imposed was $7,584.19, the former exceeded the latter
by more than one-half, i.e., it was more than one and one-half
5. 234 La. 1068, 102 So.2d 459 (1958).
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times the value of the latter, and the rules peculiar to donations
were applicable. Under the court's interpretation the provision
is read to say that the rules peculiar to donations do not apply
except when the value of the object given is double that of the
charges imposed. This is not, however, the first time this construction has been given to Article 1526.6 Indeed, it has been
construed also as providing that the rules peculiar to donations
will apply if the value of the thing given exceeds one-half (not
by one-half) the value of the charges.7 However, the result
reached through treating the transfer as onerous would have
been the same if the rules peculiar to donations had been applied.
The case of Domino v. Domino" throws additional light on
how to fix the value of property in an action of lesion beyond
moiety. The trial court had added the valuations of plaintiff's
witnesses and those of defendant's witnesses and then had taken
an average of the whole sum, basing its procedure on two earlier
cases. The opinion of Judge Hawthorne pointed out that such a
method cannot be employed in all cases and was not appropriate
to the case under consideration since the valuations placed on
the property by defendant's witnesses were not entitled to consideration and since some of those of plaintiff's witnesses were
obviously excessive. An average was taken by the court only
after these exclusions and reductions. This seems to constitute
a very sensible way of arriving at the true value of the property
at the time of the sale.
The case of Minton v. Talbert9 involved an effort to have a
sale by a mother to her daughter declared a disguised donation
and null because it divested the donor of her property without reserving enough for her subsistence, in violation of Article 1497
of the Louisiana Civil Code. The claim was properly rejected
for lack of evidence sufficient to support it.
Because terrazzo flooring in a house purchased by plaintiff
from defendant began to crack badly shortly after the sale, plaintiff in Leob v. Staples10 sued for rescission of the sale or damages
to cover the cost of remedying the defects and for a diminution
of the price. Plaintiff acquiesced in the rejection of his prayer
for rescission but answered the appeal from a judgment award6. Castleman v. Smith, 148 La. 233, 86 So. 778 (1920).
7. Succ. of Spann, 169 La. 412, 125 So. 289 (1929).
8. 233 La. 1014, 99 So.2d 328 (1958).
9. 234 La. 552, 100 So.2d 504 (1958).
10. 234 La. 642, 101 So.2d 1 (1958).
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ing damages measured only by the cost of remedying the defects.
An increase was granted to cover diminution of the value of the
house. The contention of defendant that the plaintiff was not
entitled to damages plus diminution of the price was answered
by the court in a per curiam saying that the entire award was
actually for diminution of the price in lieu of rescission. This is
in accord with settled jurisprudence to the effect that in fixing
the amount due the aggrieved purchaser in such cases the cost
of remedying the defects is taken into consideration. Where, as
in the instant case, the defects cannot be completely overcome
by any possible remedial work, an additional amount may be required to make up the difference between what the purchaser got
and what he paid for.
In Thompson v. Walker," on rehearing, 1 2 the court rejected
defendant's plea of peremption of a tax title on finding that the
adjudicatee had bought the property when sold for taxes merely
to protect its interest as mortgagee of an interest in the property
and actually for the benefit of the debtors. This it had judicially
acknowledged ten years later by foreclosing on its mortgage. Defendant, the purchaser at the foreclosure, was held bound by this
judicial admission and estopped to question the ownership of the
seized debtors in the property or to claim that he had acquired
the interest of the plaintiff which had not passed to the mortgagee-adjudicatee.
The rapid growth and development of many sections of the
state and the resulting public improvements gave rise during the
past term to a number of cases dealing with the right of eminent
domain. The central problem in all of them embraced the factors
to be considered in fixing the true value of the property taken
before the contemplated improvements under Civil Code Article
2633. The over-all design in the determination of true value is
substantially to place the owner in as good a position as he would
have enjoyed if the property had not been taken. 13 True value
is that market value or price which would be agreed upon at a
14
voluntary sale between a willing seller and a willing buyer. It
11. 235 La. 132, 103 So.2d 65 (1958).
12. See 104 So.2d 721 (La. 1958) for original opinion.
13. State Department of Highways v. Ragusa, 234 La. 51, 99 So.2d 20 (1958)
Koerber v. New Orleans, 234 La. 433, 100 So.2d 461 (1958) ; State v. Mortallaro,
234 La. 741, 101 So.2d 450 (1958).
14. State Department of Highways v. Ragusa, 234 La. 51, 99 So.2d 20 (1958)
State v. Sauls, 234 La. 241, 99 So.2d 97 (1958) ; Koerber v. New Orleans, 234 La.
433, 100 So.2d 461 (1958) ; State v. Dent, 234 La. 659, 101 So.2d 193 (1958)
State v. Mortallaro, 234 La. 741, 101 So.2d 450 (1958).
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may include in addition to the physical value of the property
taken at the time of the taking the diminution of value of the
remainder, often referred to as severance damages.1 5 Sales of
comparable property have great weight. 16 Factors such as rental
income and the value of an existing business are important. Location, zoning, assembly or platting value, topography, and
adaptability may be considered in establishing the most profitable use to which the property can be put in view of the possibilities in the not too distant future. 1 7 Although losses common
to all affected owners such as result from redirecting or diverting traffic, changes in situation with respect to parking on public thoroughfares, or narrowing streets should not be considered,
yet elements of loss not common to all owners occasioned by the
peculiar location of particular property and the manner in which
its use is affected may be included.' 8 Finally, purely consequential damages such as those flowing from loss of value of stocks
of goods or fixtures are not includable. 19 In sum, the cases demonstrate a consistency of application of the controlling principles.
LEASE
J. Denson Smith*
In Calhoun v. Gulf Refining Co.' the court was confronted
with the argument that a person who buys property subject to a
recorded lease thereby assumes the obligations of the lessor
under the lease and that since a lessor holding a one-fourth mineral interest had agreed that any additional interest he acquired
would vest in the lessee, therefore an additional interest acquired
by the person to whom he sold the property vested in the lessee.
This contention was rejected. The court pointed out that the obligation in question was personal to the vendor and did not pass
with a sale of the property and added that a lease creates a jus
15. Gravity Drainage District No. 1 of Rapides Parish v. Key, 234 La. 201,
99 So.2d 82 (1958); Texas Gas Transmission Corp. v. Broussard, 234 La. 751,
101 So.2d 657 (1958) ; State v. Sullivan, 235 La. 324, 103 So.2d 458 (1958).
16. State v. Sauls, 234 La. 241, 99 So.2d 97 (1958) ; State v. Dent, 234 La.
659, 101 So.2d 193 (1958) ; State v. Sullivan, 235 La. 324, 103 So.2d 458 (1958).
17. State v. Sauls, 234 La. 241, 99 So.2d 97 (1958) ;Koerber v. New Orleans,
234 La. 433, 100 So.2d 461 (1958) ; State v. Dent, 234 La. 659, 101 So.2d 193
(1958).
18. Cerniglia v. New Orleans, 234 La. 730, 101 So.2d 218 (1958).
19. State v. Sauls, 234 La. 241, 99 So.2d 97 (1958).
*Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. 235 La. 494, 104 So.2d 547 (1958).

